Subjects in the lab, activists in the field: public goods and punishment

Chetan Dave, Sjur Hamre, Curtis Kephart, Alicja Reuben

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social responsibility. We find that relative to laboratory subjects, activists in Mumbai are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish non-cooperative firm behavior even if such punishments hurt their own payoffs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEurasian Economic Review
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2020

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Keywords

  • Non-standard subject pool
  • Public goods
  • Punishment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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