Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'

Jonardon Ganeri

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    This chapter addresses the following question: 'Is the minimal sufficient condition for the possession of a capacity to think of oneself as oneself also a minimal sufficient condition for the possession of a self?' It examines a number of thinkers who have answered this question in the affirmative, both in the recent Western phenomenological tradition and among the schools of classical India. It tries to establish whether there are any good reasons for answering in the negative.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationSelf, No Self?
    Subtitle of host publicationPerspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
    PublisherOxford University Press
    ISBN (Electronic)9780191595691
    ISBN (Print)9780199593804
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2010

    Fingerprint

    Possession
    Selfhood
    Subjectivity
    India
    Thinkers

    Keywords

    • Asanga
    • Manas
    • Recanati
    • Self
    • Selfhood
    • Strawson
    • Subjectivity
    • The first person
    • Vasubandhu
    • Zahavi

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Arts and Humanities(all)

    Cite this

    Ganeri, J. (2010). Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'. In Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0007

    Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'. / Ganeri, Jonardon.

    Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press, 2010.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Ganeri, J 2010, Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'. in Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0007
    Ganeri J. Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'. In Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press. 2010 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0007
    Ganeri, Jonardon. / Subjectivity, Selfhood and the Use of the Word 'I'. Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press, 2010.
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