Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

Dilip Abreu, Arunava Sen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We present a necessary and almost sufficient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition α is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition α is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin's celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)285-299
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume50
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1990

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    Social choice correspondence
    Monotonicity
    Nash implementation
    No veto power

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Subgame perfect implementation : A necessary and almost sufficient condition. / Abreu, Dilip; Sen, Arunava.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1990, p. 285-299.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abreu, Dilip ; Sen, Arunava. / Subgame perfect implementation : A necessary and almost sufficient condition. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1990 ; Vol. 50, No. 2. pp. 285-299.
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