Strategies of election rigging: Trade-O s, determinants, and consequences

Zhaotian Luo, Arturas Rozenas

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Ideally, elections should peacefully allocate political power and remove bad leaders from o ce. We study how the electoral mechanism performs when the government can rig elections by manipulating the electoral process ex ante and by falsifying election returns ex post. The extent to which elections contribute to peace and accountability depends on how incumbents trade-o between the two strategies given the institutional constraints. An option to falsify election results without being exposed increases the risk of conflict even if that option is not realized in equilibrium, but an option to use ex-ante manipulation reduces the risk of conflict. Imposing constraints on one strategy of election rigging when the incumbent can substitute it with another leads to perverse trade-o s: Constraining ex-ante manipulation raises the risk of conflict, but May improve accountability. Making ex-post falsification more di cult to hide improves the prospect of peace, but worsens accountability.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-28
    Number of pages28
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Political Science
    Volume13
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    election
    determinants
    responsibility
    manipulation
    peace
    falsification
    election result
    political power
    ritual
    leader

    Keywords

    • Accountability
    • Conflict
    • Election fraud
    • Manipulation
    • Peace

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Strategies of election rigging : Trade-O s, determinants, and consequences. / Luo, Zhaotian; Rozenas, Arturas.

    In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, 01.01.2018, p. 1-28.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Luo, Zhaotian ; Rozenas, Arturas. / Strategies of election rigging : Trade-O s, determinants, and consequences. In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 2018 ; Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 1-28.
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