Strategic coordination and the law

Nicholas Almendares, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We re-examine the relationship between coordination legal sanctions and free-riding in light of the recent controversy regarding the applicability of the coordination problem paradigm of law-making. We argue that legal sanctions can help solve coordination problems by eliminating socially suboptimal equilibrium outcomes. Once coordination has taken place however free-riding can not lead to the breakdown of coordination outcomes even if sanctions may still be effective at increasing the equity of such outcomes. Finally we argue that it is the choice of a legal or constitutional system rather than the choice of law that is paradigmatic of the coordination problem. This view requires a re-assessment of the normative status of sanctions attached to individual laws.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)501-529
    Number of pages29
    JournalLaw and Philosophy
    Volume26
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Sep 2007

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    Strategic coordination and the law. / Almendares, Nicholas; Landa, Dimitri.

    In: Law and Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 5, 09.2007, p. 501-529.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Almendares, N & Landa, D 2007, 'Strategic coordination and the law', Law and Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 501-529. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-006-9005-z
    Almendares, Nicholas ; Landa, Dimitri. / Strategic coordination and the law. In: Law and Philosophy. 2007 ; Vol. 26, No. 5. pp. 501-529.
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