Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure

Bryan Rosendorff

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    The increased "legalization" embodied in the revised Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shown to be an institutional innovation that increases the opportunities for states to temporarily suspend their obligations in periods of unexpected, but heightened, domestic political pressure for protection. This increased flexibility in the system reduces per-period cooperation among states but also reduces the possibility that the regime may break down entirely. There is shown to be a trade-off between rigidity and stability in international institutional design in the face of unforeseen, but occasionally intense, domestic political pressure. In a model with a WTO that serves both an informational and adjudicatory role, it is established that agreements with DSPs are self-enforcing, are more stable, and are more acceptable to a wider variety of countries than agreements without DSPs. Evidence drawn from data on preferential trading agreements supports the key hypotheses.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)389-400
    Number of pages12
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume99
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Aug 2005

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    rigidity
    WTO
    legalization
    politics
    obligation
    flexibility
    regime
    innovation
    evidence

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Stability and rigidity : Politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. / Rosendorff, Bryan.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, 08.2005, p. 389-400.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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