Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity

The role of affect

Ernesto Reuben, Frans van Winden

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This is an experimental study of negative reciprocity in the case of multiple reciprocators. We use a three-player power-to-take game where a proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which responders are anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders' decisions, beliefs, and emotions. Our main findings are (1) friends punish the proposer more than strangers, (2) friends are more likely to coordinate their punishment (without communication), and (3) both punishment and coordination are explained by the responders' emotional reactions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)34-53
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    Volume92
    Issue number1-2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 1 2008

    Fingerprint

    Emotion
    Social ties
    Punishment
    Stranger
    Experimental study
    Communication

    Keywords

    • Affect
    • Experiment
    • Reciprocity
    • Social norms
    • Social ties

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity : The role of affect. / Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans.

    In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92, No. 1-2, 01.02.2008, p. 34-53.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Reuben, Ernesto ; van Winden, Frans. / Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity : The role of affect. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2008 ; Vol. 92, No. 1-2. pp. 34-53.
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