Social learning and coordination conventions in intergenerational games: An experimental study

Andrew Schotter, Barry Sopher

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


    We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in "intergenerational games" or games in which a sequence of non-overlapping "generations" of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t + 1. What we find is that word-of-mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory "parents" to laboratory "children") can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)498-529
    Number of pages32
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Jun 1 2003


    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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