Social Conflict and Growth

Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Despite the predictions of the neoclassical theory of economic growth, we observe that poor countries have invested at lower rates and have not grown faster than rich countries. To explain these empirical regularities we provide a game-theoretic model of conflict between social groups over the distribution of income. Among all possible equilibria, we concentrate on those that are on the constrained Pareto frontier. We study how the level of wealth and the degree of inequality affects growth. We show how lower wealth can lead to lower growth and even to stagnation when the incentives to domestic accumulation are weakened by redistributive considerations.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)125-142
    Number of pages18
    JournalJournal of Economic Growth
    Volume1
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - 1996

    Fingerprint

    Wealth
    Social conflict
    Stagnation
    Regularity
    Prediction
    Social groups
    Game-theoretic models
    Pareto
    Distribution of income
    Neoclassical theory
    Economic growth
    Incentives

    Keywords

    • Dynamic games
    • Growth
    • Social conflict

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Benhabib, J., & Rustichini, A. (1996). Social Conflict and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), 125-142.

    Social Conflict and Growth. / Benhabib, Jess; Rustichini, Aldo.

    In: Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, p. 125-142.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Benhabib, J & Rustichini, A 1996, 'Social Conflict and Growth', Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 125-142.
    Benhabib J, Rustichini A. Social Conflict and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth. 1996;1(1):125-142.
    Benhabib, Jess ; Rustichini, Aldo. / Social Conflict and Growth. In: Journal of Economic Growth. 1996 ; Vol. 1, No. 1. pp. 125-142.
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