Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors

Davood Shahrjerdi, Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Siddharth Garg, Farinaz Koushanfar, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

An integrated circuit (IC) Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) is envisioned to enable advanced supply chain hardware authentication and tracing capabilities. The suggested SHIELD is expected to be a ultra-lower power, minuscule electronic component that is physically attached to the host IC. This paper focuses on two important adversarial acts on SHIELD: physical reverse engineering and physical side-channel analysis. These attacks can be launched through mechanical or optical means and they can reveal and/or modify the confidential on-chip data or enable reverse-engineering of the design. For detection of these attacks and subsequent erasing of the sensitive data, sensors, erasure devices, and the relevant control circuitry need to be added to the SHIELD. We describe the device-level operation of the optical (photodetectors) and mechanical (nano-or micro-electromechanical switches) sensors and how they can be integrated within an IC to detect physical attacks. The operation of these micro/nano-scale sensors is unreliable due to environmental, operational, and structural fluctuations and noise. We outline system-level approaches to design a reliable countermeasure against physical attacks using unreliable sensors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages170-174
Number of pages5
Volume2015-January
EditionJanuary
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 5 2015
Event2014 33rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2014 - San Jose, United States
Duration: Nov 2 2014Nov 6 2014

Other

Other2014 33rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2014
CountryUnited States
CitySan Jose
Period11/2/1411/6/14

Fingerprint

Shielding
Supply chains
Integrated circuits
Hardware
Electronic equipment
Sensors
Reverse engineering
Low power electronics
Switches
Photodetectors
Authentication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Software

Cite this

Shahrjerdi, D., Rajendran, J., Garg, S., Koushanfar, F., & Karri, R. (2015). Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors. In IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD (January ed., Vol. 2015-January, pp. 170-174). [7001348] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD.2014.7001348

Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors. / Shahrjerdi, Davood; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; Garg, Siddharth; Koushanfar, Farinaz; Karri, Ramesh.

IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD. Vol. 2015-January January. ed. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 170-174 7001348.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Shahrjerdi, D, Rajendran, J, Garg, S, Koushanfar, F & Karri, R 2015, Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors. in IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD. January edn, vol. 2015-January, 7001348, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 170-174, 2014 33rd IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2014, San Jose, United States, 11/2/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD.2014.7001348
Shahrjerdi D, Rajendran J, Garg S, Koushanfar F, Karri R. Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors. In IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD. January ed. Vol. 2015-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 170-174. 7001348 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD.2014.7001348
Shahrjerdi, Davood ; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan ; Garg, Siddharth ; Koushanfar, Farinaz ; Karri, Ramesh. / Shielding and securing integrated circuits with sensors. IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, Digest of Technical Papers, ICCAD. Vol. 2015-January January. ed. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 170-174
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