Shame and honour drive cooperation

Jennifer Jacquet, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen, Manfred Milinski

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Can the threat of being shamed or the prospect of being honoured lead to greater cooperation? We test this hypothesis with anonymous six-player public goods experiments, an experimental paradigm used to investigate problems related to overusing common resources. We instructed the players that the two individuals who were least generous after 10 rounds would be exposed to the group. As the natural antithesis, we also test the effects of honour by revealing the identities of the two players who were most generous. The non-monetary, reputational effects induced by shame and honour each led to approximately 50 per cent higher donations to the public good when compared with the control, demonstrating that both shame and honour can drive cooperation and can help alleviate the tragedy of the commons.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)899-901
    Number of pages3
    JournalBiology Letters
    Volume7
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 23 2011

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    Keywords

    • Cooperation
    • Honour
    • Public goods game
    • Shame
    • Tragedy of the commons

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
    • Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)

    Cite this

    Jacquet, J., Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., & Milinski, M. (2011). Shame and honour drive cooperation. Biology Letters, 7(6), 899-901. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0367

    Shame and honour drive cooperation. / Jacquet, Jennifer; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne; Milinski, Manfred.

    In: Biology Letters, Vol. 7, No. 6, 23.12.2011, p. 899-901.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Jacquet, J, Hauert, C, Traulsen, A & Milinski, M 2011, 'Shame and honour drive cooperation', Biology Letters, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 899-901. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0367
    Jacquet J, Hauert C, Traulsen A, Milinski M. Shame and honour drive cooperation. Biology Letters. 2011 Dec 23;7(6):899-901. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0367
    Jacquet, Jennifer ; Hauert, Christoph ; Traulsen, Arne ; Milinski, Manfred. / Shame and honour drive cooperation. In: Biology Letters. 2011 ; Vol. 7, No. 6. pp. 899-901.
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