Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips

Mohammed Shayan, Sukanta Bhattacharjee, Tung Che Liang, Jack Tang, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The Micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) platform that supports fine-grained control and real-time sensing of droplet movements. These capabilities permit continuous monitoring and checkpoint-based validation of assay execution on MEDA. This paper presents a class of "shadow attacks" that abuse the timing slack in the assay execution. State-of-the-art checkpoint-based validation techniques cannot expose the shadow operations. We develop a defense that introduces extra checkpoints in the assay execution at time instances when the assay is prone to shadow attacks. Experiments confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the defense.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781450359504
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 5 2018
Event37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - San Diego, United States
Duration: Nov 5 2018Nov 8 2018

Other

Other37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego
Period11/5/1811/8/18

Fingerprint

Biochips
Assays
Electrodes
Digital microfluidics
Monitoring
Experiments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design

Cite this

Shayan, M., Bhattacharjee, S., Liang, T. C., Tang, J., Chakrabarty, K., & Karri, R. (2018). Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips. In 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers [a73] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1145/3240765.3240846

Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips. / Shayan, Mohammed; Bhattacharjee, Sukanta; Liang, Tung Che; Tang, Jack; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu; Karri, Ramesh.

2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. a73.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Shayan, M, Bhattacharjee, S, Liang, TC, Tang, J, Chakrabarty, K & Karri, R 2018, Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips. in 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers., a73, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018, San Diego, United States, 11/5/18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3240765.3240846
Shayan M, Bhattacharjee S, Liang TC, Tang J, Chakrabarty K, Karri R. Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips. In 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. a73 https://doi.org/10.1145/3240765.3240846
Shayan, Mohammed ; Bhattacharjee, Sukanta ; Liang, Tung Che ; Tang, Jack ; Chakrabarty, Krishnendu ; Karri, Ramesh. / Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips. 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018.
@inproceedings{f8d87babf1254ae1adda038ae2413a1a,
title = "Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips",
abstract = "The Micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) platform that supports fine-grained control and real-time sensing of droplet movements. These capabilities permit continuous monitoring and checkpoint-based validation of assay execution on MEDA. This paper presents a class of {"}shadow attacks{"} that abuse the timing slack in the assay execution. State-of-the-art checkpoint-based validation techniques cannot expose the shadow operations. We develop a defense that introduces extra checkpoints in the assay execution at time instances when the assay is prone to shadow attacks. Experiments confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the defense.",
author = "Mohammed Shayan and Sukanta Bhattacharjee and Liang, {Tung Che} and Jack Tang and Krishnendu Chakrabarty and Ramesh Karri",
year = "2018",
month = "11",
day = "5",
doi = "10.1145/3240765.3240846",
language = "English (US)",
booktitle = "2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Shadow attacks on MEDA biochips

AU - Shayan, Mohammed

AU - Bhattacharjee, Sukanta

AU - Liang, Tung Che

AU - Tang, Jack

AU - Chakrabarty, Krishnendu

AU - Karri, Ramesh

PY - 2018/11/5

Y1 - 2018/11/5

N2 - The Micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) platform that supports fine-grained control and real-time sensing of droplet movements. These capabilities permit continuous monitoring and checkpoint-based validation of assay execution on MEDA. This paper presents a class of "shadow attacks" that abuse the timing slack in the assay execution. State-of-the-art checkpoint-based validation techniques cannot expose the shadow operations. We develop a defense that introduces extra checkpoints in the assay execution at time instances when the assay is prone to shadow attacks. Experiments confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the defense.

AB - The Micro-electrode-dot-array (MEDA) is a next-generation digital microfluidic biochip (DMFB) platform that supports fine-grained control and real-time sensing of droplet movements. These capabilities permit continuous monitoring and checkpoint-based validation of assay execution on MEDA. This paper presents a class of "shadow attacks" that abuse the timing slack in the assay execution. State-of-the-art checkpoint-based validation techniques cannot expose the shadow operations. We develop a defense that introduces extra checkpoints in the assay execution at time instances when the assay is prone to shadow attacks. Experiments confirm the effectiveness and practicality of the defense.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85058191745&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85058191745&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1145/3240765.3240846

DO - 10.1145/3240765.3240846

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85058191745

BT - 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD 2018 - Digest of Technical Papers

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

ER -