Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model

Christopher Phelan, Ennio Stacchetti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a Ramsey tax model. More generally, it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households. By selectively incorporating Euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework, we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives, resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1491-1518
    Number of pages28
    JournalEconometrica
    Volume69
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2001

    Fingerprint

    Tax
    Sequential equilibrium
    Dynamic programming
    Household
    Government
    Policy games

    Keywords

    • Capital taxation
    • Government credibility
    • Recursive methods
    • Time consistent government policy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model. / Phelan, Christopher; Stacchetti, Ennio.

    In: Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 6, 2001, p. 1491-1518.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Phelan, C & Stacchetti, E 2001, 'Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model', Econometrica, vol. 69, no. 6, pp. 1491-1518. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00255
    Phelan, Christopher ; Stacchetti, Ennio. / Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model. In: Econometrica. 2001 ; Vol. 69, No. 6. pp. 1491-1518.
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