Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing

Yevgeniy Dodis, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Bartosz Przydatek

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Most cryptographic primitives such as encryption, authentication or secret sharing require randomness. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but those primitives might also be realized under weaker assumptions. In this work we continue the study of building secure cryptographic primitives from imperfect random sources initiated by Dodis and Spencer (FOCS'02). Their main result shows that there exists a (high-entropy) source of randomness allowing for perfect encryption of a bit, and yet from which one cannot extract even a single weakly random bit, separating encryption from extraction. Our main result separates encryption from 2-out-2 secret sharing (both in the information-theoretic and in the computational settings): any source which can be used to achieve one-bit encryption also can be used for 2-out-2 secret sharing of one bit, but the converse is false, even for high-entropy sources. Therefore, possibility of extraction strictly implies encryption, which in turn strictly implies 2-out-2 secret sharing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings
Pages601-616
Number of pages16
Volume3876 LNCS
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006
Event3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: Mar 4 2006Mar 7 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3876 LNCS
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006
CountryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period3/4/063/7/06

Fingerprint

Secret Sharing
Entropy
Encryption
Cryptography
Randomness
Strictly
Imply
Converse
Imperfect
Authentication
Continue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K., & Przydatek, B. (2006). Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing. In Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings (Vol. 3876 LNCS, pp. 601-616). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3876 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_31

Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing. / Dodis, Yevgeniy; Pietrzak, Krzysztof; Przydatek, Bartosz.

Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings. Vol. 3876 LNCS 2006. p. 601-616 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3876 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dodis, Y, Pietrzak, K & Przydatek, B 2006, Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing. in Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings. vol. 3876 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3876 LNCS, pp. 601-616, 3rd Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, New York, NY, United States, 3/4/06. https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_31
Dodis Y, Pietrzak K, Przydatek B. Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing. In Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings. Vol. 3876 LNCS. 2006. p. 601-616. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878_31
Dodis, Yevgeniy ; Pietrzak, Krzysztof ; Przydatek, Bartosz. / Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing. Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings. Vol. 3876 LNCS 2006. pp. 601-616 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
@inproceedings{2791021e0cef45aba29d716d676f8d13,
title = "Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing",
abstract = "Most cryptographic primitives such as encryption, authentication or secret sharing require randomness. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but those primitives might also be realized under weaker assumptions. In this work we continue the study of building secure cryptographic primitives from imperfect random sources initiated by Dodis and Spencer (FOCS'02). Their main result shows that there exists a (high-entropy) source of randomness allowing for perfect encryption of a bit, and yet from which one cannot extract even a single weakly random bit, separating encryption from extraction. Our main result separates encryption from 2-out-2 secret sharing (both in the information-theoretic and in the computational settings): any source which can be used to achieve one-bit encryption also can be used for 2-out-2 secret sharing of one bit, but the converse is false, even for high-entropy sources. Therefore, possibility of extraction strictly implies encryption, which in turn strictly implies 2-out-2 secret sharing.",
author = "Yevgeniy Dodis and Krzysztof Pietrzak and Bartosz Przydatek",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1007/11681878_31",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "3540327312",
volume = "3876 LNCS",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
pages = "601--616",
booktitle = "Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Separating sources for encryption and secret sharing

AU - Dodis, Yevgeniy

AU - Pietrzak, Krzysztof

AU - Przydatek, Bartosz

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Most cryptographic primitives such as encryption, authentication or secret sharing require randomness. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but those primitives might also be realized under weaker assumptions. In this work we continue the study of building secure cryptographic primitives from imperfect random sources initiated by Dodis and Spencer (FOCS'02). Their main result shows that there exists a (high-entropy) source of randomness allowing for perfect encryption of a bit, and yet from which one cannot extract even a single weakly random bit, separating encryption from extraction. Our main result separates encryption from 2-out-2 secret sharing (both in the information-theoretic and in the computational settings): any source which can be used to achieve one-bit encryption also can be used for 2-out-2 secret sharing of one bit, but the converse is false, even for high-entropy sources. Therefore, possibility of extraction strictly implies encryption, which in turn strictly implies 2-out-2 secret sharing.

AB - Most cryptographic primitives such as encryption, authentication or secret sharing require randomness. Usually one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but those primitives might also be realized under weaker assumptions. In this work we continue the study of building secure cryptographic primitives from imperfect random sources initiated by Dodis and Spencer (FOCS'02). Their main result shows that there exists a (high-entropy) source of randomness allowing for perfect encryption of a bit, and yet from which one cannot extract even a single weakly random bit, separating encryption from extraction. Our main result separates encryption from 2-out-2 secret sharing (both in the information-theoretic and in the computational settings): any source which can be used to achieve one-bit encryption also can be used for 2-out-2 secret sharing of one bit, but the converse is false, even for high-entropy sources. Therefore, possibility of extraction strictly implies encryption, which in turn strictly implies 2-out-2 secret sharing.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33745536421&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33745536421&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/11681878_31

DO - 10.1007/11681878_31

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 3540327312

SN - 9783540327318

VL - 3876 LNCS

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 601

EP - 616

BT - Theory of Cryptography: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006, Proceedings

ER -