Secretaries of pork? A new theory of distributive public policy

Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Scholars have focused attention toward congressional influence over distributive grant allocations, but they have less frequently examined the extent to which administrative agencies play a role in that process. We present a new theory of ideology-contingent executive decision making within a multiple-principals framework to explain the geographic distribution of policy benefits. Our theory is novel in that it locates interbranch ideological conflict and confluence at the center of bureaus allocational strategies. Discretionary Department of Labor (DOL) grants and Department of Defense (DOD) contracts from 1991 to 2002 are examined to provide evidence that agencies deliver more grants to senators with proximate ideologies. To measure bureaucratic ideology, we generate comparable ideology estimates for cabinet secretaries, presidents, and members of the U.S. Senate via an item-response model. Our findings suggest that ideological congruence between senators and DOL or DOD is associated with significantly larger amounts of grants or contracts, respectively. These findings are important as they recast our understanding of distributive politics into ideological terms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)926-945
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume71
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2009

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grant
public policy
ideology
labor
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president
decision making
politics
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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Secretaries of pork? A new theory of distributive public policy. / Bertelli, Anthony; Grose, Christian R.

In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 3, 07.2009, p. 926-945.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bertelli, Anthony ; Grose, Christian R. / Secretaries of pork? A new theory of distributive public policy. In: Journal of Politics. 2009 ; Vol. 71, No. 3. pp. 926-945.
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