Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem

Sk Subidh Ali, Ozgur Sinanoglu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We present a new scan attack on hardware implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), a representative public key cipher. The existing scan attacks on ECC exploit the Design for Testability (DfT) infrastructure of the implementation to identify the internal registers used in the scalar multiplication, and leak the secret key based on a bit-flip analysis in the scalar multiplication registers. These attacks assume two internal registers are affected by the secret key in the ECC. In practical implementations, multiple internal registers are affected by the secret key, significantly complicating the identification of the targeted registers. Furthermore, existing scan attacks rely on a switch from normal to test mode, fail against the widely utilized mode-reset countermeasure. The proposed attack identifies the internal registers in a depth-first search fashion, where registers corresponding to the innermost module of the hardware design are identified first. This attack identifies all the registers related to the secret key, and does so by remaining only in the test mode, thus overcoming both limitations of the existing scan attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages115-118
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781509003129
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2 2015
Event28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015 - Amherst, United States
Duration: Oct 12 2015Oct 14 2015

Other

Other28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015
CountryUnited States
CityAmherst
Period10/12/1510/14/15

Fingerprint

Cryptography
Design for testability
Computer hardware
Switches
Hardware

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Ali, S. S., & Sinanoglu, O. (2015). Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015 (pp. 115-118). [7315146] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315146

Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. / Ali, Sk Subidh; Sinanoglu, Ozgur.

Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 115-118 7315146.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ali, SS & Sinanoglu, O 2015, Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. in Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015., 7315146, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 115-118, 28th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015, Amherst, United States, 10/12/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315146
Ali SS, Sinanoglu O. Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 115-118. 7315146 https://doi.org/10.1109/DFT.2015.7315146
Ali, Sk Subidh ; Sinanoglu, Ozgur. / Scan attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFTS 2015. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 115-118
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