Satisfaction Approval Voting

Steven Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    Approval voting (AV) system is well suited to elect a single winner, which almost all the literature on AV since the 1970s has addressed. Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) works as follows when the candidates are individuals. A voter's satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected, whether the voter is relatively discriminating or not. This chapter considers the conditions under which, in a 3-candidate election with 2 candidates to be elected, a voter's ballot might change the outcome, either by making or breaking a tie. In 2003, the Game Theory Society used AV for the first time to elect 12 new council members from a list of 24 candidates. A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies under SAV, except approving of a least-preferred candidate, are undominated, so voters may rationally choose to approve of more than one candidate.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationMathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts
    PublisherWiley
    Pages275-298
    Number of pages24
    ISBN (Electronic)9781118853986
    ISBN (Print)9781118853887
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 8 2015

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    Keywords

    • Decision-theoretic analysis
    • Game theory society
    • Political parties
    • Satisfaction approval voting

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Mathematics(all)
    • Physics and Astronomy(all)
    • Chemistry(all)
    • Computer Science(all)

    Cite this

    Brams, S., & Kilgour, D. M. (2015). Satisfaction Approval Voting. In Mathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts (pp. 275-298). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118853887.ch11

    Satisfaction Approval Voting. / Brams, Steven; Kilgour, D. Marc.

    Mathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts. Wiley, 2015. p. 275-298.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Brams, S & Kilgour, DM 2015, Satisfaction Approval Voting. in Mathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts. Wiley, pp. 275-298. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118853887.ch11
    Brams S, Kilgour DM. Satisfaction Approval Voting. In Mathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts. Wiley. 2015. p. 275-298 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118853887.ch11
    Brams, Steven ; Kilgour, D. Marc. / Satisfaction Approval Voting. Mathematical and Computational Modeling: With Applications in Natural and Social Sciences, Engineering, and the Arts. Wiley, 2015. pp. 275-298
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