Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)434-441
    Number of pages8
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume45
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 2003

    Fingerprint

    Strategic voting
    Sampling
    Prediction
    Voting model
    Vote

    Keywords

    • Bounded rationality
    • Sampling equilibrium
    • Strategic voting

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting. / Osborne, Martin J.; Rubinstein, Ariel.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 2, 11.2003, p. 434-441.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Osborne, Martin J. ; Rubinstein, Ariel. / Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2003 ; Vol. 45, No. 2. pp. 434-441.
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