Run Boris run: Strategic voting in sequential elections

Adam Meirowitz, Joshua Tucker

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Following the 1995 Russian parliamentary election, it was suggested that Russian voters may have used their votes to send a message to the then current Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, who was scheduled to run for reelection six months later. Building on this observation, we consider the incentives for information transmission through strategic voting in systems with sequential elections. We find that when an election for a sufficiently weak institution (e.g., a parliament) precedes an election for a strong institution (e.g., a president), in any equilibrium some voters vote against their preferred party in the first election to send a message to candidates in the second election. Following a brief discussion of the intuition underlying this argument, we present a model that allows us to isolate institutional features that affect the prevalence of this type of strategic voting: the relative importance of institutions to voters, the timing of sequential elections, and the relative cost of responsiveness by candidates.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)88-99
    Number of pages12
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Volume69
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 2007

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    election
    voter
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    candidacy
    parliamentary election
    intuition
    parliament
    incentive
    costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Run Boris run : Strategic voting in sequential elections. / Meirowitz, Adam; Tucker, Joshua.

    In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1, 02.2007, p. 88-99.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Meirowitz, Adam ; Tucker, Joshua. / Run Boris run : Strategic voting in sequential elections. In: Journal of Politics. 2007 ; Vol. 69, No. 1. pp. 88-99.
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