Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes

Ashish R. Hota, Siddharth Garg, Shreyas Sundaram

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study a setting where a set of players simultaneously invest in a shared resource. The resource has a probability of failure and a return on investment, both of which are functions of the total investment by all players. We use a simple reference dependent preference model to capture players with heterogeneous risk attitudes (risk seeking, risk neutral and risk averse). We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this setting and examine the effect of different risk attitudes on players' strategies in the presence of uncertainty. In particular, we show that at the equilibrium, risk averse players are pushed out of the resource by risk seeking players. We compare the failure probabilities in the decentralized (game-theoretic) and centralized settings, and show that our proposed game belongs to the class of best response potential games, for which there are simple dynamics that allow all players to converge to the equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages535-542
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781479934096
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 2 2013Oct 4 2013

Other

Other51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period10/2/1310/4/13

Fingerprint

Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Hota, A. R., Garg, S., & Sundaram, S. (2013). Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes. In 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 (pp. 535-542). [6736571] IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736571

Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes. / Hota, Ashish R.; Garg, Siddharth; Sundaram, Shreyas.

2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. p. 535-542 6736571.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hota, AR, Garg, S & Sundaram, S 2013, Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes. in 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013., 6736571, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 535-542, 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013, Monticello, IL, United States, 10/2/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736571
Hota AR, Garg S, Sundaram S. Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes. In 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society. 2013. p. 535-542. 6736571 https://doi.org/10.1109/Allerton.2013.6736571
Hota, Ashish R. ; Garg, Siddharth ; Sundaram, Shreyas. / Resource sharing games with failures and heterogeneous risk attitudes. 2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013. IEEE Computer Society, 2013. pp. 535-542
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