### Abstract

The problem of finding an optimal defense strategy against false data injection attacks on state estimation for power systems is considered in this paper. The state of the art utilizes measurement residuals to filter faulty measurements and to detect data integrity attacks. A carefully designed coordinated attack on sensor measurements can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) and may inject arbitrary additive error to the true state estimations. In this work, we propose an optimal defense strategy by applying perturbations to the impedance of transmission lines by D-FACTS devices and monitoring their effects on the system. The problem of finding the optimal set of target transmission lines for perturbation is formulated as an optimization problem so that to minimize the maximum additive error to the true state estimations. Additionally, we have considered a game theoretic approach to obtain the optimal probability of choosing an action from the actions set for the attacker and the defender. In this case, the attacker actions are defined as targeting any subset of the set of vulnerable system states and the defender actions are defined as changing the particular choice of a set of candidate transmission lines according to the derived optimal probability for the given game. To obtain the optimal defense strategy, the worst case scenario has considered where the knowledge of the set of transmission lines to be perturbed and their level of perturbations are common information between the attacker and the defender. The effectiveness of the proposed approaches are studied through simulations for a 14-bus system.

Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018 |

Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |

Pages | 1-5 |

Number of pages | 5 |

ISBN (Electronic) | 9781538624531 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Jul 3 2018 |

Event | 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018 - Washington, United States Duration: Feb 19 2018 → Feb 22 2018 |

### Other

Other | 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018 |
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Country | United States |

City | Washington |

Period | 2/19/18 → 2/22/18 |

### Fingerprint

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Artificial Intelligence
- Energy Engineering and Power Technology
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
- Control and Optimization

### Cite this

*2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018*(pp. 1-5). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGT.2018.8403396

**Resilient power grid state estimation under false data injection attacks.** / Salehghaffari, Hossein; Khorrami, Farshad.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018.*Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1-5, 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018, Washington, United States, 2/19/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGT.2018.8403396

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Resilient power grid state estimation under false data injection attacks

AU - Salehghaffari, Hossein

AU - Khorrami, Farshad

PY - 2018/7/3

Y1 - 2018/7/3

N2 - The problem of finding an optimal defense strategy against false data injection attacks on state estimation for power systems is considered in this paper. The state of the art utilizes measurement residuals to filter faulty measurements and to detect data integrity attacks. A carefully designed coordinated attack on sensor measurements can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) and may inject arbitrary additive error to the true state estimations. In this work, we propose an optimal defense strategy by applying perturbations to the impedance of transmission lines by D-FACTS devices and monitoring their effects on the system. The problem of finding the optimal set of target transmission lines for perturbation is formulated as an optimization problem so that to minimize the maximum additive error to the true state estimations. Additionally, we have considered a game theoretic approach to obtain the optimal probability of choosing an action from the actions set for the attacker and the defender. In this case, the attacker actions are defined as targeting any subset of the set of vulnerable system states and the defender actions are defined as changing the particular choice of a set of candidate transmission lines according to the derived optimal probability for the given game. To obtain the optimal defense strategy, the worst case scenario has considered where the knowledge of the set of transmission lines to be perturbed and their level of perturbations are common information between the attacker and the defender. The effectiveness of the proposed approaches are studied through simulations for a 14-bus system.

AB - The problem of finding an optimal defense strategy against false data injection attacks on state estimation for power systems is considered in this paper. The state of the art utilizes measurement residuals to filter faulty measurements and to detect data integrity attacks. A carefully designed coordinated attack on sensor measurements can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) and may inject arbitrary additive error to the true state estimations. In this work, we propose an optimal defense strategy by applying perturbations to the impedance of transmission lines by D-FACTS devices and monitoring their effects on the system. The problem of finding the optimal set of target transmission lines for perturbation is formulated as an optimization problem so that to minimize the maximum additive error to the true state estimations. Additionally, we have considered a game theoretic approach to obtain the optimal probability of choosing an action from the actions set for the attacker and the defender. In this case, the attacker actions are defined as targeting any subset of the set of vulnerable system states and the defender actions are defined as changing the particular choice of a set of candidate transmission lines according to the derived optimal probability for the given game. To obtain the optimal defense strategy, the worst case scenario has considered where the knowledge of the set of transmission lines to be perturbed and their level of perturbations are common information between the attacker and the defender. The effectiveness of the proposed approaches are studied through simulations for a 14-bus system.

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U2 - 10.1109/ISGT.2018.8403396

DO - 10.1109/ISGT.2018.8403396

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85050701390

SP - 1

EP - 5

BT - 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT 2018

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

ER -