Repressed productive potential and revolt: Insights from an insurgency in Burundi

Cyrus Samii, Emily A. West

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    The relationship between participation in revolt and individuals' economic conditions is among the most debated in political science. While conventional economic theory suggests that those who face the poorest economic prospects are most inclined to fight, extant evidence is decidedly mixed. We address this puzzling variation by analyzing the interplay between macro-structural conditions and individuals' micro-level circumstances. Under conditions of severe group repression, we show how a "glass-ceiling" logic may operate: among the repressed group, those with relatively high productive potential may be most motivated to revolt. We test this with in-depth analysis of participation in the 1993-2003 Burundian insurgency. The data are consistent with numerous implications of the glass-ceiling logic and inconsistent with extant alternative explanations.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalPolitical Science Research and Methods
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

    Fingerprint

    Burundi
    revolt
    participation
    repression
    economic theory
    micro level
    political science
    economics
    Group
    evidence

    Keywords

    • ethnic conflict
    • human capital
    • Inequality
    • opportunity costs
    • rebellion

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Repressed productive potential and revolt : Insights from an insurgency in Burundi. / Samii, Cyrus; West, Emily A.

    In: Political Science Research and Methods, 01.01.2019.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    @article{72e8880ab6374a719db0924047fb9f40,
    title = "Repressed productive potential and revolt: Insights from an insurgency in Burundi",
    abstract = "The relationship between participation in revolt and individuals' economic conditions is among the most debated in political science. While conventional economic theory suggests that those who face the poorest economic prospects are most inclined to fight, extant evidence is decidedly mixed. We address this puzzling variation by analyzing the interplay between macro-structural conditions and individuals' micro-level circumstances. Under conditions of severe group repression, we show how a {"}glass-ceiling{"} logic may operate: among the repressed group, those with relatively high productive potential may be most motivated to revolt. We test this with in-depth analysis of participation in the 1993-2003 Burundian insurgency. The data are consistent with numerous implications of the glass-ceiling logic and inconsistent with extant alternative explanations.",
    keywords = "ethnic conflict, human capital, Inequality, opportunity costs, rebellion",
    author = "Cyrus Samii and West, {Emily A.}",
    year = "2019",
    month = "1",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1017/psrm.2019.28",
    language = "English (US)",
    journal = "Political Science Research and Methods",
    issn = "2049-8470",
    publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Repressed productive potential and revolt

    T2 - Insights from an insurgency in Burundi

    AU - Samii, Cyrus

    AU - West, Emily A.

    PY - 2019/1/1

    Y1 - 2019/1/1

    N2 - The relationship between participation in revolt and individuals' economic conditions is among the most debated in political science. While conventional economic theory suggests that those who face the poorest economic prospects are most inclined to fight, extant evidence is decidedly mixed. We address this puzzling variation by analyzing the interplay between macro-structural conditions and individuals' micro-level circumstances. Under conditions of severe group repression, we show how a "glass-ceiling" logic may operate: among the repressed group, those with relatively high productive potential may be most motivated to revolt. We test this with in-depth analysis of participation in the 1993-2003 Burundian insurgency. The data are consistent with numerous implications of the glass-ceiling logic and inconsistent with extant alternative explanations.

    AB - The relationship between participation in revolt and individuals' economic conditions is among the most debated in political science. While conventional economic theory suggests that those who face the poorest economic prospects are most inclined to fight, extant evidence is decidedly mixed. We address this puzzling variation by analyzing the interplay between macro-structural conditions and individuals' micro-level circumstances. Under conditions of severe group repression, we show how a "glass-ceiling" logic may operate: among the repressed group, those with relatively high productive potential may be most motivated to revolt. We test this with in-depth analysis of participation in the 1993-2003 Burundian insurgency. The data are consistent with numerous implications of the glass-ceiling logic and inconsistent with extant alternative explanations.

    KW - ethnic conflict

    KW - human capital

    KW - Inequality

    KW - opportunity costs

    KW - rebellion

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85067187418&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85067187418&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1017/psrm.2019.28

    DO - 10.1017/psrm.2019.28

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:85067187418

    JO - Political Science Research and Methods

    JF - Political Science Research and Methods

    SN - 2049-8470

    ER -