Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Kemal Kivanç Aköz, Pablo Hernandez-Lagos

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent-seeking activities.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
    DOIs
    StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

    Fingerprint

    dissident
    rent
    mobilization
    elite
    Group
    popular uprising
    regime
    revolt
    incidence
    Elites
    Rent
    Mobilization
    citizen

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization. / Aköz, Kemal Kivanç; Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo.

    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 01.01.2018.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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