Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Kemal Kivanç Aköz, Pablo Hernandez-Lagos

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent-seeking activities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

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dissident
rent
mobilization
elite
Group
popular uprising
regime
revolt
incidence
Elites
Rent
Mobilization
citizen

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization. / Aköz, Kemal Kivanç; Hernandez-Lagos, Pablo.

In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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