Relative earnings and giving in a real-effort experiment

Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan, Nikos Nikiforakis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between relative earnings and giving in a twostage, real-effort experiment. In the first stage, four players compete in a tournament that determines their earnings. In the second stage, they decide whether to make a transfer to one or more of their group members. Our main finding is that those ranked first are significantly less likely to give than those ranked second. This difference disappears if individuals learn about the second stage after earning their income or if earnings are randomly determined. This suggests that our main finding is driven by selection based on other-regarding preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3330-3348
Number of pages19
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume101
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011

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Experiment
Tournament
Other-regarding preferences
Income

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Relative earnings and giving in a real-effort experiment. / Erkal, Nisvan; Gangadharan, Lata; Nikiforakis, Nikos.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 7, 01.12.2011, p. 3330-3348.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Erkal, Nisvan ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Nikiforakis, Nikos. / Relative earnings and giving in a real-effort experiment. In: American Economic Review. 2011 ; Vol. 101, No. 7. pp. 3330-3348.
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