Reasoning in stages

Nishi Shah, Matthew Silverstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)101-113
    Number of pages13
    JournalEthics
    Volume124
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 8 2013

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    Counterexample
    Wrong Kind of Reasons

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy

    Cite this

    Shah, N., & Silverstein, M. (2013). Reasoning in stages. Ethics, 124(1), 101-113. https://doi.org/10.1086/671387

    Reasoning in stages. / Shah, Nishi; Silverstein, Matthew.

    In: Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 1, 08.10.2013, p. 101-113.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Shah, N & Silverstein, M 2013, 'Reasoning in stages', Ethics, vol. 124, no. 1, pp. 101-113. https://doi.org/10.1086/671387
    Shah N, Silverstein M. Reasoning in stages. Ethics. 2013 Oct 8;124(1):101-113. https://doi.org/10.1086/671387
    Shah, Nishi ; Silverstein, Matthew. / Reasoning in stages. In: Ethics. 2013 ; Vol. 124, No. 1. pp. 101-113.
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