Reasoning in stages

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-113
Number of pages13
JournalEthics
Volume124
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 8 2013

Fingerprint

Counterexample
Wrong Kind of Reasons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Reasoning in stages. / Shah, Nishi; Silverstein, Matthew.

In: Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 1, 08.10.2013, p. 101-113.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Shah, N & Silverstein, M 2013, 'Reasoning in stages', Ethics, vol. 124, no. 1, pp. 101-113. https://doi.org/10.1086/671387
Shah, Nishi ; Silverstein, Matthew. / Reasoning in stages. In: Ethics. 2013 ; Vol. 124, No. 1. pp. 101-113.
@article{ebaaf7932a834df7a2f5f89c5cb23120,
title = "Reasoning in stages",
abstract = "Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.",
author = "Nishi Shah and Matthew Silverstein",
year = "2013",
month = "10",
day = "8",
doi = "10.1086/671387",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "124",
pages = "101--113",
journal = "Ethics",
issn = "0014-1704",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reasoning in stages

AU - Shah, Nishi

AU - Silverstein, Matthew

PY - 2013/10/8

Y1 - 2013/10/8

N2 - Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

AB - Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884958398&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84884958398&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1086/671387

DO - 10.1086/671387

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84884958398

VL - 124

SP - 101

EP - 113

JO - Ethics

JF - Ethics

SN - 0014-1704

IS - 1

ER -