Reason and war

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, David Lalman

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system; treats third-party choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms; estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies; more fully represents the expected costs of conflict; and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size. By assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders’ expectations of gain, we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war, intervention, violence, and peace. The revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in Europe between 1816 and 1970.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1113-1129
    Number of pages17
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume80
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1986

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    international conflict
    escalation
    warfare
    peace
    leader
    violence
    ability
    costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Bueno De Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1986). Reason and war. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1113-1129. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400185028

    Reason and war. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Lalman, David.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 1986, p. 1113-1129.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, B & Lalman, D 1986, 'Reason and war', American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 1113-1129. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400185028
    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Lalman, David. / Reason and war. In: American Political Science Review. 1986 ; Vol. 80, No. 4. pp. 1113-1129.
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