Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability

Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Static equilibria can be viewed as steady states of recurring play of a game. Such steady states in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others need not be Nash equilibria. This paper suggests a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium, that corresponds to such steady states. To present it, the basic model of a normal form game is enriched by specifying the signals that players get about others′ actions. The solution is a profile of actions such that each player′s action is optimal given that it is common knowledge that all players maximize utility given their signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)299-311
    Number of pages13
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume6
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1994

    Fingerprint

    Rationalizability
    Nash equilibrium
    Common knowledge
    Normal form games
    Economics
    Solution concepts

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium : Between Nash and Rationalizability. / Rubinstein, Ariel; Wolinsky, Asher.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1994, p. 299-311.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Rubinstein, Ariel ; Wolinsky, Asher. / Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium : Between Nash and Rationalizability. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1994 ; Vol. 6, No. 2. pp. 299-311.
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