Random oracles in constantinople

practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography

Christian Cachin, Klaus Kursawe, Victor Shoup

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
PublisherACM
Pages123-132
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2000
Event19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - Portland, OR, USA
Duration: Jul 16 2000Jul 19 2000

Other

Other19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
CityPortland, OR, USA
Period7/16/007/19/00

Fingerprint

Cryptography
Communication
Processing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Cachin, C., Kursawe, K., & Shoup, V. (2000). Random oracles in constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (pp. 123-132). ACM.

Random oracles in constantinople : practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. / Cachin, Christian; Kursawe, Klaus; Shoup, Victor.

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM, 2000. p. 123-132.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Cachin, C, Kursawe, K & Shoup, V 2000, Random oracles in constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. in Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM, pp. 123-132, 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Portland, OR, USA, 7/16/00.
Cachin C, Kursawe K, Shoup V. Random oracles in constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM. 2000. p. 123-132
Cachin, Christian ; Kursawe, Klaus ; Shoup, Victor. / Random oracles in constantinople : practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM, 2000. pp. 123-132
@inproceedings{f952b9c317a544f6b89a33caf37fd8d4,
title = "Random oracles in constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography",
abstract = "Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.",
author = "Christian Cachin and Klaus Kursawe and Victor Shoup",
year = "2000",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "123--132",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing",
publisher = "ACM",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Random oracles in constantinople

T2 - practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography

AU - Cachin, Christian

AU - Kursawe, Klaus

AU - Shoup, Victor

PY - 2000

Y1 - 2000

N2 - Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.

AB - Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0034500567&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0034500567&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 123

EP - 132

BT - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

PB - ACM

ER -