Abstract
Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Pages | 123-132 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| State | Published - 2000 |
| Event | 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing - Portland, OR, USA Duration: Jul 16 2000 → Jul 19 2000 |
Other
| Other | 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing |
|---|---|
| City | Portland, OR, USA |
| Period | 7/16/00 → 7/19/00 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Hardware and Architecture
Cite this
Random oracles in constantinople : practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography. / Cachin, Christian; Kursawe, Klaus; Shoup, Victor.
Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM, 2000. p. 123-132.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Random oracles in constantinople
T2 - practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using cryptography
AU - Cachin, Christian
AU - Kursawe, Klaus
AU - Shoup, Victor
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.
AB - Byzantine agreement requires a set of parties in a distributed system to agree on a value even if some parties are corrupted. A new protocol for Byzantine agreement in a completely asynchronous network is presented that makes use of cryptography, specifically of threshold signatures and coin-tossing protocols. These cryptographic protocols have practical and provably secure implementations in the 'random oracle' model. In particular, a coin-tossing protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is presented and analyzed. The resulting asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol is both practical and nearly matches the known theoretical lower bounds. More precisely, it tolerates the maximum number of corrupted parties, runs in constant expected time, has message and communication complexity close to the maximum, and uses a trusted dealer only in a setup phase, after which it can process a virtually unlimited number of transactions. Novel dual-threshold variants of both cryptographic protocols are used. The protocol is formulated as a transaction processing service in a cryptographic security model, which differs from the standard information-theoretic formalization and may be of independent interest.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:0034500567
SP - 123
EP - 132
BT - Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
PB - ACM
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