Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two-Party Parliamentary Systems

Tasos Kalandrakis, Arthur Spirling

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We estimate the parameters of a reputational game of political competition using data from five two-party parliamentary systems. We find that latent party preferences (and party reputations) persist with high probability across election periods, with one exception: parties with extreme preferences who find themselves out of power switch to moderation with higher probability than the equivalent estimated likelihood for parties in government (extreme or moderate) or for moderate parties in opposition. We find evidence for the presence of significant country-specific differences. We subject the model to a battery of goodness-of-fit tests and contrast model predictions with survey and vote margin data not used for estimation. Finally, according to the estimated model parameters, Australia is less than half as likely to experience extreme policies and Australian governments can expect to win more consecutive elections in the long run as compared to their counterparts in Greece, Malta, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)413-432
    Number of pages20
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume56
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 2012

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    election
    party preference
    Malta
    reputation
    Greece
    voter
    New Zealand
    opposition
    evidence
    experience

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Radical Moderation : Recapturing Power in Two-Party Parliamentary Systems. / Kalandrakis, Tasos; Spirling, Arthur.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 2, 04.2012, p. 413-432.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Kalandrakis, Tasos ; Spirling, Arthur. / Radical Moderation : Recapturing Power in Two-Party Parliamentary Systems. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2012 ; Vol. 56, No. 2. pp. 413-432.
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