Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]

Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called 'cheap talk signaling games' capture the dynamic and information-asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. In this paper, we investigate a model of signaling games in which the receiver can detect deception with some probability. This model nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stackelberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. Then we illustrate these analytical results with an application to active network defense. The presence of evidence forces majority-truthful behavior and eliminates some pure strategy equilibria. It always benefits the deceived player, but surprisingly sometimes also benefits the deceiving player.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages394-395
Number of pages2
Volume2017-January
ISBN (Electronic)9781538606834
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 19 2017
Event2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: Oct 9 2017Oct 11 2017

Other

Other2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017
CountryUnited States
CityLas Vegas
Period10/9/1710/11/17

Fingerprint

Network security
Active networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Pawlick, J., & Zhu, Q. (2017). Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017 (Vol. 2017-January, pp. 394-395). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2017.8228694

Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]. / Pawlick, Jeffrey; Zhu, Quanyan.

2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017. Vol. 2017-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 394-395.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Pawlick, J & Zhu, Q 2017, Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]. in 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017. vol. 2017-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 394-395, 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017, Las Vegas, United States, 10/9/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2017.8228694
Pawlick J, Zhu Q. Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017. Vol. 2017-January. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 394-395 https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2017.8228694
Pawlick, Jeffrey ; Zhu, Quanyan. / Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]. 2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2017. Vol. 2017-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. pp. 394-395
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