Quality-of-service provisioning in decentralized networks: A satisfaction equilibrium approach

Samir M. Perlaza, Tembine Hamidou, Samson Lasaulce, Mérouane Debbah

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper introduces a particular game formulation and its corresponding notion of equilibrium, namely the satisfaction form (SF) and the satisfaction equilibrium (SE). A game in SF models the case where players are uniquely interested in the satisfaction of some individual performance constraints, instead of individual performance optimization. Under this formulation, the notion of equilibrium corresponds to the situation where all players can simultaneously satisfy their individual constraints. The notion of SE, models the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized self-configuring networks. Here, radio devices are satisfied if they are able to provide the requested QoS. Within this framework, the concept of SE is formalized for both pure and mixed strategies considering finite sets of players and actions. In both cases, sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the SE are presented. When multiple SE exist, we introduce the idea of effort or cost of satisfaction and we propose a refinement of the SE, namely the efficient SE (ESE). At the ESE, all players adopt the action which requires the lowest effort for satisfaction. A learning method that allows radio devices to achieve a SE in pure strategies in finite time and requiring only one-bit feedback is also presented. Finally, a power control game in the interference channel is used to highlight the advantages of modeling QoS problems following the notion of SE rather than other equilibrium concepts, e.g., generalized Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6109304
Pages (from-to)104-116
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Topics in Signal Processing
Volume6
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2012

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Quality of service
Power control
Feedback
Costs

Keywords

  • Adhoc networks
  • decentralized networks
  • game theory
  • quality-of-service
  • satisfaction equilibrium
  • self-configuring devices
  • strategic learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Quality-of-service provisioning in decentralized networks : A satisfaction equilibrium approach. / Perlaza, Samir M.; Hamidou, Tembine; Lasaulce, Samson; Debbah, Mérouane.

In: IEEE Journal on Selected Topics in Signal Processing, Vol. 6, No. 2, 6109304, 01.04.2012, p. 104-116.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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