Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve

Ellen E. Meade, David Stasavage

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with 'career concerns'to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)695-717
Number of pages23
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume118
Issue number528
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2008

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Federal Reserve
Incentives
Publicity
Dissent
Deliberation
Observer
Decision making
Transparency
Career concerns
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Publicity of debate and the incentive to dissent : Evidence from the US Federal Reserve. / Meade, Ellen E.; Stasavage, David.

In: Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 528, 04.2008, p. 695-717.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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