Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini, Andrés Velasco

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production requires private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time inconsistent. We therefore introduce explicitly the constraint that at no point in time the revision of the original tax plan is desirable. We completely characterize the (third best) tax plan that satisfies this constraint, and estimate the difference in tax rate between the second and third best policy for a wide range of parameters. For some of these the difference between the second and third best tax rates is large, and so are the associated rates of economic growth.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)371-396
    Number of pages26
    JournalReview of Economic Design
    Volume6
    Issue number3-4
    StatePublished - 2001

    Fingerprint

    Public capital
    Tax rate
    Tax
    Public spending
    Optimal tax
    Government
    Distortionary taxation
    Infinite horizon
    Representative agent
    Production economies
    Economic growth
    Tax policy

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    Cite this

    Benhabib, J., Rustichini, A., & Velasco, A. (2001). Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment. Review of Economic Design, 6(3-4), 371-396.

    Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment. / Benhabib, Jess; Rustichini, Aldo; Velasco, Andrés.

    In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 6, No. 3-4, 2001, p. 371-396.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Benhabib, J, Rustichini, A & Velasco, A 2001, 'Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment', Review of Economic Design, vol. 6, no. 3-4, pp. 371-396.
    Benhabib J, Rustichini A, Velasco A. Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment. Review of Economic Design. 2001;6(3-4):371-396.
    Benhabib, Jess ; Rustichini, Aldo ; Velasco, Andrés. / Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment. In: Review of Economic Design. 2001 ; Vol. 6, No. 3-4. pp. 371-396.
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