Protecting sovereignty, protecting the planet: State delegation to international organizations and private actors in environmental politics

Jessica Green, Jeff Colgan

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    As global interdependence grows, states often use international organizations to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. One way states respond to demands for cooperation is to delegate to international organizations and private actors. In this article, we use new data spanning a century of international environmental law to understand when and why states delegate to international organizations to manage environmental problems. We find that delegation is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the implementation of states' preferences. However, they make this decision with care: States tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and enforcement. We also find that heterogeneous preferences among states increases the likelihood of delegation. Overall, our results suggest that states seek to delegate out of a motivation both to reduce transaction costs and to establish credible commitments.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)473-497
    Number of pages25
    JournalGovernance
    Volume26
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2013

    Fingerprint

    International Organizations
    sovereignty
    politics
    domestic policy
    environmental law
    transaction costs
    interdependence
    international law
    foreign policy
    environmental impact
    International organizations
    Environmental politics
    Sovereignty
    Delegation
    commitment
    monitoring
    costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Public Administration
    • Marketing

    Cite this

    Protecting sovereignty, protecting the planet : State delegation to international organizations and private actors in environmental politics. / Green, Jessica; Colgan, Jeff.

    In: Governance, Vol. 26, No. 3, 07.2013, p. 473-497.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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