### Abstract

Proofs of Retrievability (PoR), introduced by Juels and Kaliski [JK07], allow the client to store a file F on an untrusted server, and later run an efficient audit protocol in which the server proves that it (still) possesses the client's data. Constructions of PoR schemes attempt to minimize the client and server storage, the communication complexity of an audit, and even the number of file-blocks accessed by the server during the audit. In this work, we identify several different variants of the problem (such as bounded-use vs. unbounded-use, knowledge-soundness vs. information-soundness), and giving nearly optimal PoR schemes for each of these variants. Our constructions either improve (and generalize) the prior PoR constructions, or give the first known PoR schemes with the required properties. In particular, we Formally prove the security of an (optimized) variant of the bounded-use scheme of Juels and Kaliski [JK07], without making any simplifying assumptions on the behavior of the adversary. Build the first unbounded-use PoR scheme where the communication complexity is linear in the security parameter and which does not rely on Random Oracles, resolving an open question of Shacham and Waters [SW08]. Build the first bounded-use scheme with information-theoretic security. The main insight of our work comes from a simple connection between PoR schemes and the notion of hardness amplification, extensively studied in complexity theory. In particular, our improvements come from first abstracting a purely information-theoretic notion of PoR codes, and then building nearly optimal PoR codes using state-of-the-art tools from coding and complexity theory.

Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Theory of Cryptography - 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, Proceedings |

Pages | 109-127 |

Number of pages | 19 |

Volume | 5444 LNCS |

DOIs | |

State | Published - 2009 |

Event | 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009 - San Francisco, CA, United States Duration: Mar 15 2009 → Mar 17 2009 |

### Publication series

Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 5444 LNCS |

ISSN (Print) | 03029743 |

ISSN (Electronic) | 16113349 |

### Other

Other | 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009 |
---|---|

Country | United States |

City | San Francisco, CA |

Period | 3/15/09 → 3/17/09 |

### Fingerprint

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computer Science(all)
- Theoretical Computer Science

### Cite this

*Theory of Cryptography - 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, Proceedings*(Vol. 5444 LNCS, pp. 109-127). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5444 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_8

**Proofs of Retrievability via Hardness Amplification.** / Dodis, Yevgeniy; Vadhan, Salil; Wichs, Daniel.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*Theory of Cryptography - 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, Proceedings.*vol. 5444 LNCS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5444 LNCS, pp. 109-127, 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, San Francisco, CA, United States, 3/15/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_8

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Proofs of Retrievability via Hardness Amplification

AU - Dodis, Yevgeniy

AU - Vadhan, Salil

AU - Wichs, Daniel

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Proofs of Retrievability (PoR), introduced by Juels and Kaliski [JK07], allow the client to store a file F on an untrusted server, and later run an efficient audit protocol in which the server proves that it (still) possesses the client's data. Constructions of PoR schemes attempt to minimize the client and server storage, the communication complexity of an audit, and even the number of file-blocks accessed by the server during the audit. In this work, we identify several different variants of the problem (such as bounded-use vs. unbounded-use, knowledge-soundness vs. information-soundness), and giving nearly optimal PoR schemes for each of these variants. Our constructions either improve (and generalize) the prior PoR constructions, or give the first known PoR schemes with the required properties. In particular, we Formally prove the security of an (optimized) variant of the bounded-use scheme of Juels and Kaliski [JK07], without making any simplifying assumptions on the behavior of the adversary. Build the first unbounded-use PoR scheme where the communication complexity is linear in the security parameter and which does not rely on Random Oracles, resolving an open question of Shacham and Waters [SW08]. Build the first bounded-use scheme with information-theoretic security. The main insight of our work comes from a simple connection between PoR schemes and the notion of hardness amplification, extensively studied in complexity theory. In particular, our improvements come from first abstracting a purely information-theoretic notion of PoR codes, and then building nearly optimal PoR codes using state-of-the-art tools from coding and complexity theory.

AB - Proofs of Retrievability (PoR), introduced by Juels and Kaliski [JK07], allow the client to store a file F on an untrusted server, and later run an efficient audit protocol in which the server proves that it (still) possesses the client's data. Constructions of PoR schemes attempt to minimize the client and server storage, the communication complexity of an audit, and even the number of file-blocks accessed by the server during the audit. In this work, we identify several different variants of the problem (such as bounded-use vs. unbounded-use, knowledge-soundness vs. information-soundness), and giving nearly optimal PoR schemes for each of these variants. Our constructions either improve (and generalize) the prior PoR constructions, or give the first known PoR schemes with the required properties. In particular, we Formally prove the security of an (optimized) variant of the bounded-use scheme of Juels and Kaliski [JK07], without making any simplifying assumptions on the behavior of the adversary. Build the first unbounded-use PoR scheme where the communication complexity is linear in the security parameter and which does not rely on Random Oracles, resolving an open question of Shacham and Waters [SW08]. Build the first bounded-use scheme with information-theoretic security. The main insight of our work comes from a simple connection between PoR schemes and the notion of hardness amplification, extensively studied in complexity theory. In particular, our improvements come from first abstracting a purely information-theoretic notion of PoR codes, and then building nearly optimal PoR codes using state-of-the-art tools from coding and complexity theory.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70350681128&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70350681128&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_8

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_8

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 3642004563

SN - 9783642004568

VL - 5444 LNCS

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 109

EP - 127

BT - Theory of Cryptography - 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009, Proceedings

ER -