Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)52-67
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

Fingerprint

Priority rules
Population monotonicity
Single-peaked preferences
Pareto efficiency
Median
Paradox
Anonymity
Sovereignty
Congestion
Interest groups
Strategy-proofness
Strategy-proof

Keywords

  • Generalized median voter rules
  • Hierarchical rules
  • Multiple public facilities
  • No-show paradox
  • Object-population monotonicity
  • Priority rules
  • Sovereignty
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities. / Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 74, No. 1, 01.01.2012, p. 52-67.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{92617db23bf04fcfa11b2355d350b84c,
title = "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities",
abstract = "A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among {"}interest groups{"}. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.",
keywords = "Generalized median voter rules, Hierarchical rules, Multiple public facilities, No-show paradox, Object-population monotonicity, Priority rules, Sovereignty, Strategy-proofness",
author = "Olivier Bochet and Sidartha Gordon",
year = "2012",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "74",
pages = "52--67",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

AU - Bochet, Olivier

AU - Gordon, Sidartha

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

AB - A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among "interest groups". We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

KW - Generalized median voter rules

KW - Hierarchical rules

KW - Multiple public facilities

KW - No-show paradox

KW - Object-population monotonicity

KW - Priority rules

KW - Sovereignty

KW - Strategy-proofness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84855191814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84855191814&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84855191814

VL - 74

SP - 52

EP - 67

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -