### Abstract

We study the negative consequences of selfish behavior in a congested network and economic means of influencing such behavior. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times (the total latency). It is well known that the outcome of selfish routing (a Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the total latency. An ancient strategy for improving the selfish solution is the principle of marginal cost pricing, which asserts that on each edge of the network, each network user on the edge should pay a tax offsetting the congestion effects caused by its presence. By pricing network edges according to this principle, the inefficiency of selfish routing can always be eradicated. This result, while fundamental, assumes a very strong homogeneity property: all network users are assumed to trade off time and money in an identical way. The guarantee also ignores both the algorithmic aspects of edge pricing and the unfortunate possibility that an efficient routing of traffic might only be achieved with exorbitant taxes. Motivated by these shortcomings, we extend this classical work on edge pricing in several different directions and prove the following results. We prove that the edges of a single-commodity network can always be priced so that an optimal routing of traffic arises as a Nash equilibrium, even for very general heterogeneous populations of network users. When there are only finitely many different types of network users and all edge latency functions are convex, we show how to compute such edge prices efficiently. We prove that an easy-to-check mathematical condition on the population of heterogeneous network users is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of edge prices that induce an optimal routing while requiring only moderate taxes.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Title of host publication | Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing |

Pages | 521-530 |

Number of pages | 10 |

State | Published - 2003 |

Event | 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing - San Diego, CA, United States Duration: Jun 9 2003 → Jun 11 2003 |

### Other

Other | 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing |
---|---|

Country | United States |

City | San Diego, CA |

Period | 6/9/03 → 6/11/03 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Game theory
- Nash equilibria
- Network pricing
- Selfish routing

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Software

### Cite this

*Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*(pp. 521-530)

**Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users.** / Cole, Richard; Dodis, Yevgeniy; Roughgarden, Tim.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing.*pp. 521-530, 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, San Diego, CA, United States, 6/9/03.

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users

AU - Cole, Richard

AU - Dodis, Yevgeniy

AU - Roughgarden, Tim

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - We study the negative consequences of selfish behavior in a congested network and economic means of influencing such behavior. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times (the total latency). It is well known that the outcome of selfish routing (a Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the total latency. An ancient strategy for improving the selfish solution is the principle of marginal cost pricing, which asserts that on each edge of the network, each network user on the edge should pay a tax offsetting the congestion effects caused by its presence. By pricing network edges according to this principle, the inefficiency of selfish routing can always be eradicated. This result, while fundamental, assumes a very strong homogeneity property: all network users are assumed to trade off time and money in an identical way. The guarantee also ignores both the algorithmic aspects of edge pricing and the unfortunate possibility that an efficient routing of traffic might only be achieved with exorbitant taxes. Motivated by these shortcomings, we extend this classical work on edge pricing in several different directions and prove the following results. We prove that the edges of a single-commodity network can always be priced so that an optimal routing of traffic arises as a Nash equilibrium, even for very general heterogeneous populations of network users. When there are only finitely many different types of network users and all edge latency functions are convex, we show how to compute such edge prices efficiently. We prove that an easy-to-check mathematical condition on the population of heterogeneous network users is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of edge prices that induce an optimal routing while requiring only moderate taxes.

AB - We study the negative consequences of selfish behavior in a congested network and economic means of influencing such behavior. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times (the total latency). It is well known that the outcome of selfish routing (a Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the total latency. An ancient strategy for improving the selfish solution is the principle of marginal cost pricing, which asserts that on each edge of the network, each network user on the edge should pay a tax offsetting the congestion effects caused by its presence. By pricing network edges according to this principle, the inefficiency of selfish routing can always be eradicated. This result, while fundamental, assumes a very strong homogeneity property: all network users are assumed to trade off time and money in an identical way. The guarantee also ignores both the algorithmic aspects of edge pricing and the unfortunate possibility that an efficient routing of traffic might only be achieved with exorbitant taxes. Motivated by these shortcomings, we extend this classical work on edge pricing in several different directions and prove the following results. We prove that the edges of a single-commodity network can always be priced so that an optimal routing of traffic arises as a Nash equilibrium, even for very general heterogeneous populations of network users. When there are only finitely many different types of network users and all edge latency functions are convex, we show how to compute such edge prices efficiently. We prove that an easy-to-check mathematical condition on the population of heterogeneous network users is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of edge prices that induce an optimal routing while requiring only moderate taxes.

KW - Game theory

KW - Nash equilibria

KW - Network pricing

KW - Selfish routing

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038446895&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0038446895&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 521

EP - 530

BT - Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

ER -