Practical bargaining procedures and their game-theoretic foundations

Steven Brams

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Game-theoretic models of bargaining can roughly be divided into two categories: cooperative and noncooperative. This paper focuses on the latter, but with an emphasis different from that found in most of the current literature. Practical procedures are proposed for resolving conflicts, by which are meant well-defined and easily understood rules that facilitate two bargainers' reaching a settlement that is beneficial to both in a two-person nonconstant-sum game of incomplete information. This is not to say that these procedures can readily be applied, although the article illustrates how they might be implemented in the concluding section. The rules described all involve sequential processes. Provided that two sides agree initially that there is a zone of agreement that makes them both better off - but do not know exactly what this zone is - they are induced to narrow their differences over time. Three different sets of rules that give two bargainers the incentive to converge are described.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)263-275
    Number of pages13
    JournalInformation and decision technologies Amsterdam
    Volume16
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - 1990

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Engineering(all)

    Cite this

    Practical bargaining procedures and their game-theoretic foundations. / Brams, Steven.

    In: Information and decision technologies Amsterdam, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1990, p. 263-275.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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