Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines

Cesi Cruz, Julien Labonne, Pablo Querubin Borrero

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We demonstrate the importance of politician social networks for electoral outcomes. Using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15, 000 villages in the Philippines, we show that candidates for public office are disproportionately drawn from more central families and family network centrality contributes to higher vote shares during the elections. Consistent with our theory of political intermediation, we present evidence that family network centrality facilitates relationships of political exchange. Moreover, we show that family networks exercise an effect independent of wealth, historical elite status, or previous electoral success.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)3006-3037
    Number of pages32
    JournalAmerican Economic Review
    Volume107
    Issue number10
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    Philippines
    Politicians
    Network centrality
    Intermediation
    Exercise
    Wealth
    Elites
    Vote
    Social networks
    Elections

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Politician family networks and electoral outcomes : Evidence from the Philippines. / Cruz, Cesi; Labonne, Julien; Querubin Borrero, Pablo.

    In: American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 10, 01.10.2017, p. 3006-3037.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Cruz, Cesi ; Labonne, Julien ; Querubin Borrero, Pablo. / Politician family networks and electoral outcomes : Evidence from the Philippines. In: American Economic Review. 2017 ; Vol. 107, No. 10. pp. 3006-3037.
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