Political survival and endogenous institutional change

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Incumbent political leaders risk deposition by challengers within the existing political rules and by revolutionary threats. Building on Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's selectorate theory, the model here examines the policy responses of office-seeking leaders to revolutionary threats. Whether leaders suppress public goods such as freedom of assembly and freedom of information to hinder the organizational ability of potential revolutionaries or appease potential revolutionaries by increasing the provision of public goods depends, in part, on the sources of government revenues. Empirical tests show that governments with access to revenue sources that require few labor inputs by the citizens, such as natural resource rents or foreign aid, reduce the provision of public goods and increase the odds of increased authoritarianism in the face of revolutionary pressures. In contrast, without these sources of unearned revenues, governments respond to revolutionary pressures by increasing the provision of public goods and democratizing.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)167-197
    Number of pages31
    JournalComparative Political Studies
    Volume42
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 2009

    Fingerprint

    institutional change
    government revenue
    leader
    freedom of assembly
    threat
    freedom of information
    authoritarianism
    rent
    natural resources
    revenue
    labor
    citizen
    ability

    Keywords

    • Democratization
    • Endogenous institutional change
    • Leader survival
    • Political institutions
    • Revolution
    • Selectorate politics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Political survival and endogenous institutional change. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair.

    In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, 02.2009, p. 167-197.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Smith, Alastair. / Political survival and endogenous institutional change. In: Comparative Political Studies. 2009 ; Vol. 42, No. 2. pp. 167-197.
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