Political Succession: A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)707-743
    Number of pages37
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume61
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1 2017

    Fingerprint

    politics
    leader
    threat
    government revenue
    mass movement
    democratization
    public policy
    economy
    Threat
    health
    Government
    Government revenue
    Democratization
    Health
    Factors
    Rebellion
    Public policy
    Relative risk
    Private benefits

    Keywords

    • domestic politics
    • game theory
    • political survival
    • rebellion
    • selectorate theory

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

    Cite this

    Political Succession : A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics. / Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair.

    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, No. 4, 01.04.2017, p. 707-743.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ; Smith, Alastair. / Political Succession : A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2017 ; Vol. 61, No. 4. pp. 707-743.
    @article{30c403f6c4dd4d72b6bb21e2b2e07379,
    title = "Political Succession: A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics",
    abstract = "In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.",
    keywords = "domestic politics, game theory, political survival, rebellion, selectorate theory",
    author = "{Bueno De Mesquita}, Bruce and Alastair Smith",
    year = "2017",
    month = "4",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1177/0022002715603100",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "61",
    pages = "707--743",
    journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
    issn = "0022-0027",
    publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
    number = "4",

    }

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Political Succession

    T2 - A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics

    AU - Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce

    AU - Smith, Alastair

    PY - 2017/4/1

    Y1 - 2017/4/1

    N2 - In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

    AB - In addition to everyday political threats, leaders risk removal from office through coups and mass movements such as rebellion. Further, all leaders face threats from shocks such as downturns in their health, their country’s economy, or their government’s revenue. By integrating these risks into the selectorate theory, we characterize the conditions under which each threat is pertinent and the countermoves (purges, democratization, expansion of public goods, and expansion of private benefits) that best enable the leader to survive in office. The model identifies new insights into the nature of assassins; the relative risk of different types of leader removal as a function of the extant institutions of government; and the endogenous factors driving better or worse public policy and decisions to democratize or become more autocratic. Importantly, the results highlight how an increase in the risk of deposition via one means intensifies other removal risks.

    KW - domestic politics

    KW - game theory

    KW - political survival

    KW - rebellion

    KW - selectorate theory

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85014657718&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85014657718&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1177/0022002715603100

    DO - 10.1177/0022002715603100

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:85014657718

    VL - 61

    SP - 707

    EP - 743

    JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution

    JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution

    SN - 0022-0027

    IS - 4

    ER -