Perceiving credible commitments: How independent regulators shape elite perceptions of regulatory quality

Anthony Bertelli, Andrew B. Whitford

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Numerous recent studies have addressed how the investment choices of firms depend on elite perceptions of the quality of national regulatory regimes. Likewise, other studies show that government structures can help to support credible commitments that protect market mechanisms. The authors provide the first analytic discussion of elite perceptions of national regulatory quality as a function of the independence of regulators in a countrys political system. Their central claims are that market operations depend on perceptions of regulatory quality and that independent regulators facilitate elite perceptions of regulatory quality because they check actors in domestic political systems. Cross-national statistical evidence suggests that regulatory independence supports elite perceptions of high regulatory quality. This article also provides evidence that regulatory independence is more likely where political competition shapes incentives to intervene in business markets.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)517-537
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume39
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2009

Fingerprint

elite
commitment
political system
market mechanism
market
evidence
incentive
firm

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Perceiving credible commitments : How independent regulators shape elite perceptions of regulatory quality. / Bertelli, Anthony; Whitford, Andrew B.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 3, 07.2009, p. 517-537.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{4ddd2894783d4863a7aa50f1705a4c6d,
title = "Perceiving credible commitments: How independent regulators shape elite perceptions of regulatory quality",
abstract = "Numerous recent studies have addressed how the investment choices of firms depend on elite perceptions of the quality of national regulatory regimes. Likewise, other studies show that government structures can help to support credible commitments that protect market mechanisms. The authors provide the first analytic discussion of elite perceptions of national regulatory quality as a function of the independence of regulators in a countrys political system. Their central claims are that market operations depend on perceptions of regulatory quality and that independent regulators facilitate elite perceptions of regulatory quality because they check actors in domestic political systems. Cross-national statistical evidence suggests that regulatory independence supports elite perceptions of high regulatory quality. This article also provides evidence that regulatory independence is more likely where political competition shapes incentives to intervene in business markets.",
author = "Anthony Bertelli and Whitford, {Andrew B.}",
year = "2009",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1017/S0007123409000623",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "39",
pages = "517--537",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perceiving credible commitments

T2 - How independent regulators shape elite perceptions of regulatory quality

AU - Bertelli, Anthony

AU - Whitford, Andrew B.

PY - 2009/7

Y1 - 2009/7

N2 - Numerous recent studies have addressed how the investment choices of firms depend on elite perceptions of the quality of national regulatory regimes. Likewise, other studies show that government structures can help to support credible commitments that protect market mechanisms. The authors provide the first analytic discussion of elite perceptions of national regulatory quality as a function of the independence of regulators in a countrys political system. Their central claims are that market operations depend on perceptions of regulatory quality and that independent regulators facilitate elite perceptions of regulatory quality because they check actors in domestic political systems. Cross-national statistical evidence suggests that regulatory independence supports elite perceptions of high regulatory quality. This article also provides evidence that regulatory independence is more likely where political competition shapes incentives to intervene in business markets.

AB - Numerous recent studies have addressed how the investment choices of firms depend on elite perceptions of the quality of national regulatory regimes. Likewise, other studies show that government structures can help to support credible commitments that protect market mechanisms. The authors provide the first analytic discussion of elite perceptions of national regulatory quality as a function of the independence of regulators in a countrys political system. Their central claims are that market operations depend on perceptions of regulatory quality and that independent regulators facilitate elite perceptions of regulatory quality because they check actors in domestic political systems. Cross-national statistical evidence suggests that regulatory independence supports elite perceptions of high regulatory quality. This article also provides evidence that regulatory independence is more likely where political competition shapes incentives to intervene in business markets.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67749133403&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=67749133403&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0007123409000623

DO - 10.1017/S0007123409000623

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:67749133403

VL - 39

SP - 517

EP - 537

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

IS - 3

ER -