People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest

Adam Meirowitz, Joshua Tucker

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a "one-shot deal." We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the "one-shot deal": when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government-as most previous models of adverse selection assume-but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)478-490
    Number of pages13
    JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
    Volume57
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 2013

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    protest
    citizen
    pessimism
    learning process
    election
    incentive
    uncertainty
    governance
    politics
    learning
    performance

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest. / Meirowitz, Adam; Tucker, Joshua.

    In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 2, 04.2013, p. 478-490.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Meirowitz, Adam ; Tucker, Joshua. / People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest. In: American Journal of Political Science. 2013 ; Vol. 57, No. 2. pp. 478-490.
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