Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model

Michael Laver, Ernest Sergenti

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Abstract

    Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. Here Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti offer the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. Laver and Sergenti model party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where today's political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterday's political outcomes. Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic "valence" advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    PublisherPrinceton University Press
    Number of pages278
    ISBN (Electronic)9781400840328
    ISBN (Print)9780691139043
    StatePublished - Oct 10 2011

    Fingerprint

    politician
    voter
    political actor
    political system
    new technology
    election
    interaction

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)

    Cite this

    Laver, M., & Sergenti, E. (2011). Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model. Princeton University Press.

    Party Competition : An Agent-Based Model. / Laver, Michael; Sergenti, Ernest.

    Princeton University Press, 2011. 278 p.

    Research output: Book/ReportBook

    Laver, M & Sergenti, E 2011, Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model. Princeton University Press.
    Laver M, Sergenti E. Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model. Princeton University Press, 2011. 278 p.
    Laver, Michael ; Sergenti, Ernest. / Party Competition : An Agent-Based Model. Princeton University Press, 2011. 278 p.
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