Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization

How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers

Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, Pablo Querubin Borrero

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Abstract

    Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn out. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of polling stations-and thus electoral information about broker performance-in Mexican electoral precincts, we find that greater monitoring capacity increases turnout and votes for the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the effect of monitoring capacity on PRI votes varies nonlinearly with the distance of voters to the polling station: it first increases because rural voters-facing larger costs of voting-generally favor the PRI, before declining as the cost of incentivizing brokers increases. This nonlinearity is not present for the PAN, who stand to gain less from mobilizing rural voters.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)160-179
    Number of pages20
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Volume110
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Feb 1 2016

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    mobilization
    voter
    monitoring
    costs
    performance
    voting
    incentive
    present

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    Cite this

    Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization : How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. / Larreguy, Horacio; Marshall, John; Querubin Borrero, Pablo.

    In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 110, No. 1, 01.02.2016, p. 160-179.

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

    Larreguy, Horacio ; Marshall, John ; Querubin Borrero, Pablo. / Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization : How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. In: American Political Science Review. 2016 ; Vol. 110, No. 1. pp. 160-179.
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