Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting

Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A commodity is shared between some individuals: there is an initial allocation; some selection procedures are used to choose an alternative allocation and individuals decide between keeping the initial allocation or shifting to the alternative allocation. The selection procedures are supposed to involve an element of randomness in order to reflect uncertainty about economic, social and political processes. It is shown that for every allocation, λ, there exists a number, ζ(λ)∈[0, 1], such that, if the number of individuals tends to infinity, then the probability that a proportion of the population smaller (resp. larger) than ζ(λ) prefers an allocation chosen by the selection procedure converges to 1 (resp. 0). The index ζ(λ) yields a complete order in the set of Pareto optimal allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are provided.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)295-325
    Number of pages31
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Volume41
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 1 2001

    Fingerprint

    Pareto Optimum
    Majority Voting
    Politics
    voting
    Selection Procedures
    selection procedure
    Uncertainty
    Alternatives
    Economics
    Optimal Allocation
    Randomness
    Pareto optimum
    Majority voting
    Proportion
    Choose
    commodity
    Infinity
    Tend
    Population
    Converge

    Keywords

    • D72
    • Infra-majority voting
    • Pareto-optimal allocations

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Psychology(all)
    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

    Cite this

    Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting. / Crès, Hervé; Tvede, Mich.

    In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 41, No. 3, 01.05.2001, p. 295-325.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Crès, Hervé ; Tvede, Mich. / Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 2001 ; Vol. 41, No. 3. pp. 295-325.
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