Optimal taxes without commitment

Jess Benhabib, Aldo Rustichini

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is well known, however, that this solution is time inconsistent; so if the commitment power is not perfect, this second best tax plan will not be sustainable. We model explicitly the trade-off between the cost of revising the tax plan, and the benefit of the revision. As a result, when commitment is not possible, both the limit tax rate and the steady state capital are different from their levels in the second best solution. Limit taxes on capital may be strictly positive; but it may also be the case that the only sustainable plan has subsidies to capital. The subsidies induce an overaccumulation of capital, which becomes a commitment device against revisions of the tax plan.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: H21, C73.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)231-259
    Number of pages29
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume77
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1997

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    Tax
    Optimal tax
    Subsidies
    Tax rate
    Labor
    Government
    Optimal taxation
    Tax burden
    Economics
    Trade-offs
    Optimal solution
    Costs

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Cite this

    Optimal taxes without commitment. / Benhabib, Jess; Rustichini, Aldo.

    In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 77, No. 2, 12.1997, p. 231-259.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Benhabib, J & Rustichini, A 1997, 'Optimal taxes without commitment', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 231-259. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2334
    Benhabib, Jess ; Rustichini, Aldo. / Optimal taxes without commitment. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 1997 ; Vol. 77, No. 2. pp. 231-259.
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