One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Rabah Amir, John Wooders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-25
Number of pages25
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume31
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2000

Fingerprint

Innovators
Research joint ventures
Spillover
Social benefits
Incentives
Economics
Product market competition
Strategic substitutes
Duopoly
Submodularity

Keywords

  • Oligopolistic R&D
  • One-way spillovers
  • Research joint ventures
  • Submodularity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures. / Amir, Rabah; Wooders, John.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 1, 01.04.2000, p. 1-25.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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