On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall

Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the "paradox of the absentminded driver."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, D0.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)3-24
    Number of pages22
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume20
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 1997

    Fingerprint

    Imperfect recall
    Randomization
    Extensive games
    Economics
    Time consistency
    Decision making
    Paradox

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

    Cite this

    On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall. / Piccione, Michele; Rubinstein, Ariel.

    In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 1, 07.1997, p. 3-24.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Piccione, Michele ; Rubinstein, Ariel. / On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 1997 ; Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 3-24.
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