On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing

Yong Liu, Honggang Zhang, Weibo Gongt, Don Towsley

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we study the interaction between overlay routing and Traffic Engineering (TE) in a single Autonomous System (AS). We formulate this interaction as a two-player non-cooperative non-zero sum game, where the overlay tries to minimize the delay of its traffic and the TE's objective is to minimize network cost. We study a Nash routing game with best-reply dynamics, in which the overlay and TE have equal status, and take turns to compute their optimal strategies based on the response of the other player in the previous round. We prove the existence, uniqueness and global stability of Nash equilibrium point (NEP) for a simple network. For general networks, we show that the selfish behavior of an overlay can cause huge cost increases and oscillations to the whole network. Even worse, we have identified cases, both analytically and experimentally, where the overlay's cost increases as the Nash routing game proceeds even though the overlay plays optimally based on TE's routing at each round. Experiments are performed to verify our analysis.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies
EditorsK. Makki, E. Knightly
Pages2543-2553
Number of pages11
Volume4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
EventIEEE INFOCOM 2005 - Miami, FL, United States
Duration: Mar 13 2005Mar 17 2005

Other

OtherIEEE INFOCOM 2005
CountryUnited States
CityMiami, FL
Period3/13/053/17/05

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Experiments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Liu, Y., Zhang, H., Gongt, W., & Towsley, D. (2005). On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing. In K. Makki, & E. Knightly (Eds.), Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (Vol. 4, pp. 2543-2553) https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2005.1498539

On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing. / Liu, Yong; Zhang, Honggang; Gongt, Weibo; Towsley, Don.

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. ed. / K. Makki; E. Knightly. Vol. 4 2005. p. 2543-2553.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Liu, Y, Zhang, H, Gongt, W & Towsley, D 2005, On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing. in K Makki & E Knightly (eds), Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. vol. 4, pp. 2543-2553, IEEE INFOCOM 2005, Miami, FL, United States, 3/13/05. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2005.1498539
Liu Y, Zhang H, Gongt W, Towsley D. On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing. In Makki K, Knightly E, editors, Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Vol. 4. 2005. p. 2543-2553 https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.2005.1498539
Liu, Yong ; Zhang, Honggang ; Gongt, Weibo ; Towsley, Don. / On the interaction between overlay routing and underlay routing. Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM 2005. The Conference on Computer Communications - 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. editor / K. Makki ; E. Knightly. Vol. 4 2005. pp. 2543-2553
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